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ISSUES PRESENTED IN RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
I. ARE ATTORNEY FEES AWARD FOR THE DEFENDANT APPROPRIATE 
UNDER Rivas v, K C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, (July 25, 2000) WHEN NO 
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENTS ARE PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH BAD FAITH 
OR IMPROPER PURPOSE 
II. COULD THE COMMISSION JUST AS EASIL Y HAVE FOUND THAT 
APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE TIMEL Y NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY APPELLANT 
I. DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THE CLAIMANT 
WAS REFUSED TO PROVIDER A COMPLETE COPY OF THE AGENCY 
RECORD TO CLAIMANT AND REFUSED TO AUGMENT THE RECORD? 
II. DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED 
ADMISSION OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS, WHICH 
WERE CREATED IN THE HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE, IN VIOLATION OF 
IDAHO JUDICIAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE lOG AND 
IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE? 
III. DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED 
THE ADMISSION OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS, 
WHICH WERE CREATED IN THE HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE, UNLESS 
CLAIMANT COULD AFFORD A CERTIFIED TRANSLATION IN VIOLATION 
OF CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS? 
IV. DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY 
WITHDREW CLAIMANT'S COURT APPOINTED TRANSLATOR AND 
REFUSED TO ALLOW THE COURT INTERPRETER TO ORALL Y 
TRANSLATE THE REMAINDER EXHIBITS AFTER CLAIMANT WITHDREW 
VARIOUS RECORDS TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS TO 
TRANSLATE IN VIOLATION OF CLAIMANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RlGHTS? 
V. DID THE REFEREE AND THE INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY FAILED 
TO GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN CLAIMANT-APPELLANT'S FIRST 
AND SECOND VERIFIED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS WHICH REQUESTED 
SANCTIONS OR AN ORDER TO COMPEL FILED ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST 
OF SEPTEMBER 2011 AND THE ASSOCIATED ORDERS ON MOTION 
DATED NOVEMBER 4,2011 AND FILED ON OR ABOUT THE 23RD OF 
NOVEMBER2011 ? 
VI. DID THE COMMISSION ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION AND/OR LACK 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE WHEN THEY 
DETERMINED THAT THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT DID NOT PROVDE 
THAT HE SUFFERED A WORK-RELATED ACCIDENT WHILE PICKING 
APPLES FOR CORRAL AGRlCUTURE AT WILLIAM'S ORCHARDS ON OR 
ABOUT SEPTEMBER 10, 20107 
2 
ISSUES PRESENTED IN RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
I. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED FOR THE DEFENDANT 
APPROPRIATE UNDER RIVAS V. K. C. LOGGING, 134 Idaho 603, (July 25, 
2000) WHEN NO EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENTS ARE PRESENTED TO 
ESTABLISH BAD FAITH OR IMPROPER PURPOSE 
A. Idaho Law Regarding Attorney Fees in Workers Compensation 
The court addressed the standards it would apply in detennining whether or not to 
award attorney's fees against a Claimant in the case of Rivas v, K. C. Logging, 134 Idaho 
603, (July 25, 2000) where the court stated: 
Generally, this court does not award attorney's fees in appeals by Claimants from 
decisions of the Industrial Commission. Idaho Code §72-1375(2) ("No individual 
claiming benefits shall be charged fees or costs of any kind in any proceeding 
under this Chapter. .. by any court or any officer thereof, except that a court may 
assess costs if the court determines that the' proceedings have been instituted or 
continued without reasonable ground."); Teevan v. Office a/the Attorney General, 
130 Idaho 79, 34-55, 936 P.2d 1321, 1326-27 (1997). 
Where legitimate issues exist, this court has declined to award attorney's fees in 
Claimant's appeal from the Industrial Commission. See Bullard v. Sun Valley 
Aviation, Inc., 128 Idaho 430, 435, 914 P.2d 564, 569 (1996). Even where 
substantial and competent evidence exists and the Claimant mounts a factually-
based appeal, this court imposes sanctions pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
11.1 only if the appellants' arguments are "made in bad faith" or "interposed 
for any improper purpose." Tupper v. State Farm Insurance, 131 Idaho 724, 731, 
963 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1998). [emphasis added] 
Respondents are of the position that they are entitled to fees due to the allegation 
that Appellant's brief was merely a request to, "reconsider the testimony and evidence and 
call into question and review the credibility determinations of the Industrial Commission." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 34). Respondents interpreted Rivas incorrectly as the 
3 
Respondents' arguments imply that attorney's fees are awarded for any and all cases if 
Appellant's brief addresses the credibility determinations. The court in Stevens-McAtee v. 
Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325 (2008) not only denied claims for fees and costs by the 
Respondent regarding McAtee's appeal regarind a request to reconsider the testimony and 
evidence and call into question and review the credibility determinations of the Industrial 
Commission, the Court even reversed the ruling and finding of the referee decision 
regarding credibility IN FAVOR of the Claimant when it found that the Commission's 
findings on McAtee's substantive credibility were not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
Respondents' claim for attorney's fees also fails as there is no evidence, records, or 
arguments on what grounds are used to establish that the Appeal herein was made "in bad 
faith" or "interposed for any improper purpose". 
Respondent did allege that Appellant, "misrepresented what transpired" regarding 
withdrawal of the translator. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 35). The record is supportive of 
Appellant's argument that the Industrial Commission withdrew the translator when it 
refused to allow Appellant the use of the translator to translate of the medical records in 
violation ofldaho Court Administrative Rule 52 and Idaho Code 9-205. 
Respondents also interpreted Appellant's appeal incorrectly. Appellant does not 
merely ask the Supreme Court to reweigh substantial evidence of various witnesses or 
4 
direct evidence that contradicted Appellant's evidence. Appellant's case presents 
substantial questions of law, policy, and Constitutional issues including: 
1. The Industrial Commission's failure to honor the Order to Compel previously 
granted and or to grant Appellant's relief regarding discovery and sanctions 
against the Respondent for \\tithholding and failing to provide discovery before 
the hearing, including, but not limited to the current address, current i-9, 
current employment records of the employees that were working with 
Appellant during the week of the accident. 
2. The Industrial Commission's failure to grant Appellant's relief regarding 
Respondent Employer's failure to appear at their first deposition and failure to 
appear at the hearing in letter, via telephone, or in person after receiving a 
Subpoena Issued by the Industrial Commission. 
3. The Industrial Commission's disregard for Idaho Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 10 G by disallowing Appellant's medical records because they were 
created in Spanish, despite Rule lOG allowing the admissibility of "Any 
medical report(s)" without any exclusions. 
4. The Referee and Industrial Commission's requirement that the cost and burden 
to provide the certified translation of his medical records of Appellant that were 
created in Spanish, the native language of the Appellant. 
5 
5. The temporary withdrawal of the court appointed Spanish Translator by not 
allowing the translator to translate the medical records. 
6. The violation of the United States Constitution, Amendments 5 and 14; and 
Idaho State Constitution, Article 1, Sections 13 and 18 by expressly and or 
impliedly creating an unnecessary burden or treatment of minorities. 
7. The Industrial Commission's decision to refuse to provide Appellant a copy of 
the exhibits and obtain such at his individual cost and time in violation of Idaho 
Appellate Rules 28- 29. 
8. The Industrial Commission's decision to refuse to provide Appellant a copy of 
access to the audio recording of the hearings on the 10th of January 2012 and 
the 2nd of March 2012 in violation of Idaho Appellate Rules 28-29 which 
prevented Appellant to augment the record and provide additional transcripts of 
the Industrial Commission's "New Rule" created at the hearing to require 
medical records only in English. Rule 10 H( 1) of JRP requires the parties to 
request hearing transcript, and arguably the hearing audio, directly from the 
Commission; thereby preventing direct access from the court reporter. 
prohibits the' parties from requesting the transcript, and arguabley also, the 
audio, from the 
B. An Award of Attorney Fee is Inappropriate Because the Elements of Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l) and 54(e)(1) are not met. 
6 
Respondent further states that Counsel for Appellant violated Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 11(a)(1) which requires four elements namely that 1: Appellant's Appeal 
is not well grounded in fact, 2: is not warranted by existing law, 3: is not for a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, AND 4: that it is 
interposed for an improper purpose. Respondent also argues Appellant violated Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(1) which alleges that the Appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 34-
36). 
Respondent's Brief did not specifically address how all the four elements above 
were violated, if any at all, by Counsel for the Appellant. The only insight into the 
concerns found is when Respondent argued that Counsel for Appellant should pay 
Respondent's attorney fees because Appellant is merely asking the Supreme Court to 
merely, "reconsider the testimony and evidence and call into question and review the 
credibility determinations of the Industrial Commission" under Talbot v. Ames Const., 127 
Idaho 648 (1995) (Respondent's Brief, p. 34); however, such standard misapplies the law 
and four elements required above and clarified in Rivas v, K. C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, 
(July 25, 2000). Therefore, counsel herein is unable to address in detail and with any 
additional specificity that was outlined above. 
First, Appellant incorporates the arguments made above and in Appellants opening 
brief that the factual assertions made herein are based on the record, support the claims of 
7 
the Appellant, and warrant the appeal herein. Second, the law cited and provided herein 
and Appellant's opening brief supports the claims made in the Appeal. Third, Appellant 
has the right and is exercising his right to modifY or reverse the Industrial Commission's 
"New Rule" of only admitting medical records provided in English despite the statute 
allowing "Any" medical records. Fourth, Counsel herein certifies under penalty of perjury 
that no motive was present other than to correct the findings and rulings made by the 
Industrial Commission that affected the Appellant and will affect hundreds of current and 
future clients of Counsel herein. The Respondents' Brief, again, does not clarifY what 
"improper purpose" is alleged by Respondent herein. 
Counsel for the Respondent is in-house counsel and therefore the Respondent will 
not incur any additional costs and therefore is in axiomatic to imply that Counsel for 
Appellant is pursuing this matter for any delay or to increase costs for the Respondent. 
Respondent finally specifically alleged that Appellant, "misrepresented what 
transpired" regarding withdrawal of the translator. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 35). The 
record is supportive of Appellant's argument that the Industrial Commission withdrew the 
translator when it refused to allow Appellant the use of the translator to translate of the 
medical records in violation ofIdaho Court Administrative Rule 52 and Idaho Code 9-205. 
C. Talbot v. Ames Const. 
Talbot is not applicable and distinguished from the Appellant. Ames Construction 
presented three doctors who testified against Talbot and Talbot presented one doctor that 
8 
testified in his favor. The Supreme Court explained the grounds for attorney fees against 
Talbot and stated that Talbot's single argument on appeal is to reweigh the credibility of 
the three doctors who disagreed with his single doctor and that, 
No argument is made by Talbot that the Commission's findings are not supported 
by substantial, competent evidence in the record. In fact, at oral argument before 
this Court, the attorney for Talbot admitted without exception that the record 
contains substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's 
findings. [emphasis added] 
Talbot v. Ames Canst., 127 Idaho 648, 650 (1995). 
The Supreme Court further clarified the holding for the attorney fees award as the 
evidence reflected because, 
Three of the four physicians who examined Talbot concluded that there was no 
causal connection between the September 1991 incident and Talbot's condition. 
The one physician who believed that it was probable that the September 1991 
injury was the cause of Talbot's condition was found to be less credible by the 
Commission. The Commission relied upon the opinions of the three physicians 
who testified that there was no causal connection between the September 1991 
incident and Talbot's condition. 
Id. 
"The Commission concluded that while some incident did occur, the 
preponderance of the medical evidence established that the event did not cause an injury 
nor did it cause or aggravate Talbot's condition." Id. 
Unlike Talbot, the Appellant here is not asking the court to discount the testimony 
of three medical professionals who disagreed with Appellant's one doctor. Appellant's 
case herein is to address the legal issues outlined above. The sole issue decided by the 
Industrial Commission herein was whether Appellant suffered a work related injury on or 
9 
about the 10th of September 20lO. Appellant provided direct evidence that was not 
contradicted by any direct evidence namely: 
1. Appellant underwent Physical Therapy wherein Mark Colin, LPT, gave the 
opinion letter on the January 4, 2012 that Mr. Fonseca's condition and 
treatment was "highly likely" caused by his fall from the ladder on September 
10, 2010, and that Mr. Fonseca's work restrictions continued from December 
15,2010 to the date ofthe letter. (C9:114 - 117). 
2. Appellant underwent an MRI on the February 24, 3011 due to low back pain 
extending into the lower extremities, which demonstrated disk bulging at L5 
and L4 - L5. (C5:46 - 47). 
3. Appellant was working for the Respondent on September 10, 2010 picking 
apples from a ladder as reflected in Mr. Fonseca's drawing documented in his 
deposition exhibit and C16 and C17; fell off a ladder while picking apples; 
landing on his gluteus, and hurt his feet, hip, and back to his neck (T.R. 74: 17 -
76:5). 
4. That that there were approximately five or six people present when he fell; 
(T.H. 76: 10- 13); 
5. Roberto "Tito" Corral, Jr. did not perform any investigation into Mr. Fonseca's 
accident. (T.R. 318:13 - 319:1); (Deposition of Roberto Corral, Jr. 29:14 - 25). 
10 
6. Mr. Corral did not attempt to contact any of the witnesses that were working on 
the September 10, 2010 even though about half of them remained in his 
employ. (T.H. 321:1- 18) 
7. The Respondent employer failed to locate and present testimony of coworkers 
that were working on the September 10, 2010 to contradict the signed letters 
provided by Nazario Marquez and Bruno Aguilar that supports Appellant's 
testimony. (C19:1 - 6). 
8. Respondent employer, Mr. Coral did not attempt to contact Nazario Marquez 
or Bruno Aguilar after receiving thir signed letters witnesses. (T.H. 322:4 -
15) 
9. Appellant notified Respondent employer Roberto Corral Sr. (President) of the 
accident who relocated the Appellant to light duty work due to the accident. 
(T.H. 85:21- 86:20). 
10. Respondent employer Roberto Corral Sr. advanced Appellant for medical costs 
associated with the accident that occurred on or about the 10th of September 
2010. (T.R. 83:13-16). 
11. Respondent employer Mr. Coronado did not start working at the Williamson 
Orchard until the September 17 or 18,2010, one week after the accident. (T.H. 
291:1-13)(CI5;5:10 - 18) 
11 
12. Appellant's coworkers continued working for various days at the site of the 
accident. However, Mr. Fonseca did not work at the Williamson Orchard after 
September 10,2010. (Claimant's Exhibit 12 Deposition page 13 lines 3 - 20), 
(hereinafter "CI2; 13:3 - 20"); (C20; 1 - 12 of Deposition of Roger 
Williamson). 
13. Mr. Fonseca reported to the Emergency Room on visits after December 2010 
including January 7, and June 27,2011, and presented continuing complaints of 
pain regarding the work injury of September 2010. These complaints included 
hip pain down to the bottom of his foot and issued pain medication. (C7:82 -
84; C8:97 - 112) 
14. Appellant's medical records on February 2, 2011 reflect a diagnosis of low 
back pain with left radiculopathy status post falling from a ladder. Mr. Fonseca 
demonstrates symptoms consistent with a lumbar derangement with unilateral 
or asymmetrical symptoms below the knee. Mr. Fonseca also demonstrated 
complication with the low back, foot, calf, thigh, buttock etc. (C6:58) and such 
symptoms and complications despite treatment for over two weeks (C6:52, 54 -
62,64 - 66). 
15. Sarai and Ana Fonseca's testimony that Appellant notified them of the accident 
the day it happened and experienced and demonstrated symptoms consistent 
12 
with the fall starting the 10th of September 2010 (T.H. 167:18 - 170:25) and 
(T.R. 175:20 - 176:16; TH 187:15 - 17). 
16. Mr. Roger Williamson, the President of the orchard and the contractor of 
Respondent employer herein, recalled being notified on the September 10, 
2010 by John Williamson, the Vice President, regarding an accident that month 
which involved a worker of Corral who slipped off the ladder, that the worker 
didn't want to work on the ladder anymore, that there was no more work 
available, and the worker's supervisor sent him somewhere else. (T.H.206:14 
- 22; 213:4 - 15: 214: 16 - 23); During a conversation "With the vice president, he 
recalled speaking telephonically with John Williamson regarding a worker who 
was likely Hispanic that had an accident in September 2010. (T.H. 207:16 -
209:5). Mr. Williamson further testified that John Williamson told him this 
worker was injured on the foot and was instructed to go home to see if he 
would get better and return if he felt better the next day. (T.H. 210: 1 - 211 :5). 
Williamson Orchard records reflect that Mr. Fonseca worked up until 
September 10, 2010 and did not work after September 10, 2010 (CI2; 13:3 -
20). 
17. Mr. Williamson stated that an Hispanic person from Mr. Corral's crew was 
injured in September 2010 by slipping off a ladder and was instructed to go 
13 
home to see if he would get better. (C12; 16:1 - 16) (C12; 20:3) (C12; 24:21 -
25). 
18. John Williamson testified that was the co-owner and manager of the field 
operations of Williamson Orchard and responsible to supervise crews; (T .H. 
239:12 - 15). Further, Mr. Williamson testified that he was present during his 
brother Roger Williamson's testimony and that such testimony was truthful. 
(T.H. 239:22 - 240:2). 
Appellant therefore asks this court to deny Respondents' request for fees and costs 
and grant Appellant fees and costs to Appellant, under the same law cited by Respondent, 
as the case law cited above does not support the arguments made by Respondents incurring 
additional time and resources to protect Appellant and his counsel herein. 
II. THE COMMISSION COULD NOT JUST AS EASILY HAVE FOUND THAT 
APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT 
Respondents herein argue that timely notice was lacking and therefore any error was 
de minimus as the Industrial Commission would have denied the claim anyways; however, 
Respondents failed to provide evidence or testimony to contradict or refute Appellant's 
evidence of the following: 
1. Appellant gave oral notice to Roberto Corral, Sr. (President) and Luisa Corral 
(Secretary) within two weeks of the accident (T.H. 81:21 - 83:4), who then 
transferred Appellant to another site to perform lighter duty work throwing leaves 
into a grinder for a couple weeks (T.H. 85:21 - 86:20). Oral notice is sufficient for 
14 
workers' compensation purposes to provide the employer actual notice of the 
injury. I.e. § 72-701. Tonahill v. LeGrand Johnson Canst. Co., 1998, 963 P.2d 
1174, 131 Idaho 737 
2. Roberto Corral, Sr. gave Mr. Fonseca $200.00 cash for medical expenses due to 
the accident; (T.R. 83:13-16) therefore, pursuant to IC 72-701, the notice 
requirement is waived due to voluntary payment and acknowledged the accident 
and notice thereof. Mr. Facer received previous payments for benefits prior to the 
insurer and adjuster obtaining the case. The Court held that the previous, 
"[p ]ayment was compensation for injuries for which claimant's employer admits 
liability and must be considered, in substance, as compensation paid by the 
employer. By making this payment claimant's employer through its surety tolled 
the statute of limitations and bound the appellant to his act. Facer v. E. R. Steed 
Equipment Co., 95 Idaho 608, 613 (Idaho 1973) 
3. Appellant, approximately one month after the accident, also gave written notice 
to Roberto Corral, Sr. (T.R. 83:23 - 84:4). 
4. Respondents admitted that no prejudice occurred by the lack of notice as they 
failed to or attempt to investigate or locate witnesses to the accident. Roberto 
Corral, Jr. did not perform any investigation into Mr. Fonseca's accident and would 
not have done any different investigation if Mr. Fonseca had notified him of the 
accident on November 1, 2010. (TR 318:13 - 319:1; Deposition of Roberto 
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Corral, Jr. 29:14 - 25). Additionally, Mr. Corral, Jr. did not attempt to contact any 
of the witnesses that were working on the September 10, 2010 even though about 
half of them still work for him. (TH 321:1 - 18). After notice was acknowledged 
by Robero Corral, Jr. he did not attempt to contact these witnesses. (TH 322:4 
15). Finally, Mr. Coral testified that he did not believe any witness had 
disappeared because the Mr. Fonseca allegedly waited 30 days and that the 
company was not harmed by the alleged extra 30 days. (T.H. 345 :24 - 346: 1; 
347:24 - 348:1). Therefore, notice was sufficient under Idaho Code 72-704 even if 
it was given after 60 -days as no prejudice existed. See also McCoy v. Sunshine 
Mining Co., 97 Idaho 675 (1976) 
Appellant asks this Court to find that the errors made by the Industrial Commission 
were not de minimus and deny the Respondent's requests above. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY APPELLANT 
VII. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO PROVIDE THE CLAIMANT 
WITH A COMPLETE COpy OF THE AGENCY RECORD AND REFUSED 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD. 
The Industrial Commission, after the commencement of the formal hearing for the 
Appellant on the 10th of January 2012, took a recess, and in response to Appellant's 
medical records being produced in their original form from the doctor in Spanish, 
introduced a new rule that required all medical records to be in English or be attached by a 
translation into English by a certified translator, at cost to the Appellant, and not 
performed by a party or their counsel. 
Appellant wished to augment the record of such New Rule by obtaining the audio 
of the hearing, provide a transcript and augment the record with such "New Rule" for this 
court. Unfortunately, Counsel was unable to obtain such audio directly from the court 
reporter and the Industrial did not produce a copy of any of the audio of the hearing to 
allow Appellant to augment the record. 
Idaho Appellate Rule IAR 28(C) states that, "The clerk's or agency's record shall 
also include all additional documents requested by any party in the notice of appeal, notice 
of cross-appeal and requests for additional documents in the record." Appellant requested 
that the audio and the exhibits be included and withheld. Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a) 
states 
17 
Upon the receipt of the reporter's transcript and upon completion of the clerk's 
or agency's record, the clerk of the district court or administrative agency shall 
serve copies of the reporter's transcript and clerk's or agency's record upon the 
parties by serving one copy of the transcript and record on the appellant and one 
copy of the transcript and record on the respondent. 
Despite Appellant incurring and paying for the copy of the transcript and copies of 
the entire record for the appeal, Appellant was also refused a copy of the exhibits 
presented and admitted at the hearings. Appellant was required to incur the costs to travel 
and the fees at the Idaho Supreme Court building on the 22nd of May 2013. Appellant asks 
this court to take judicial notice of such fees and transactions. 
VIII. THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED 
ADMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS 
WHICH WERE CREATED IN HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE IN VIOLATION 
OF IDAHO JUDICIAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 10 G 
AND IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Respondents' interpretation of lOG is not correct. Statutory interpretation must be 
interpreted in conjunction with statutes and prior decisions. Idaho Code 72-708 states the, 
Process and procedure under this law shall be as summary and simple a reasonably 
may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity. 
Industrial Commission proceedings have been informal and designed for 
simplicity; further, the primary purpose of these proceedings being the attainment of 
justice in each individual case. Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596 (1990). 
"Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law are designed to afford employees a 
speedy, summary and simple remedy for the recovery of compensation for injuries 
sustained in industrial accidents ... " Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263-
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64 (1968) see Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 579 (1975), see Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 
107 Idaho 13 (1984). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, 
technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P.2d 759,760 (1996). 
Further, the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 
956, 793 P .2d 187, 188 (1990). 
Idaho law and policy regarding workers compensation has long held the position to 
err on the side of the employee and to admit evidence. Rule lOG of the JRP should be 
interpreted in co~unction with the policy and law cited above and below and should not 
be interpreted to construe that the employee should bear the additional burden and costs of 
retaining a certified interpreter to present evidence at hearing. 
Rule lOG of the JRP clarified that medical records are not excluded because they 
are hearsay. At the time of the passage of Rule lOG, medical records were not admissible 
in civil trial unless foundation and authenticity were established through a witness and 
therefore lOG clarified that not authenticity and or foundation were required to save costs 
to the Claimant. Further, Administrative law allowed additional flexibility to allow 
additional evidence not normally admissibility in a civil trial. 
Also, Rule lOG of the JRP does not allow for the hearing officer to refuse 
allowing the translator to translate the limited remaining medical records especially when 
Appellant withdrew records to limit the time to translate the remaining medical records. 
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The hearing offer disallowed the translation by Counsel for the Appellant and the 
appointed translator and therefore refusing the Appellant and Respondents to make 
informed decisions on whether the records were relevant. 
Finally, the inclusion of only Claimants, and most applicable herein, the inclusion 
of only Minority Claimants for additional costs, are not the proper party to be the 
recipients of additionally burdens of costs and expenses. Claimants, especially Minority 
Claimants, are injured workers, unemployed, in debt for past medical bills, in collections 
and or facing outside litigation, are without income to pay for the daily necessities and 
needed treatment, let alone additional costs of translation of medical records. The case 
herein involved the hearing officer's refusal to withdraw the appointed translator to 
translate the remaining records in Spanish for a few minutes at the expense of the 
Claimant and under the creation of the New Rule. 
IX. THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED THE 
ADMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MEDICAL RECORDS 
WHICH WERE CREATED IN HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE UNLESS HE 
COULD AFFORD A CERTIFIED TRANSLATION IN VIOLATION OF 
THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
As cited above, Idaho Code 72-708 states that the 
Process and procedure under this law shall be as summary and simple a reasonably 
may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity. 
Further, the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally 
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liberally construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 
955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). Therefore, in the event of the necessity to incur a 
burden when a Claimant does not speak English, would be to liberally construe such 
policy in his favor and not place the burden of translation upon him. 
The Industrial Commission denied the Admissibility of Medical Records created 
by Claimant's treating physician on the grounds that the treating physician created the 
language in Claimant's native language of Spanish (January 10, 2012 Hearing: 72:16 -
73:18. See also Claimant's Exhibit 1, pages 4,5,6; Exhibit 6, page 54). The Referee and 
Industrial Commission required the cost and burden to provide the certified translation 
shall be borne by the claimant not the Commission (January 10,2012 Hearing 73:19-24). 
This ruling was made despite previously stating that the Spanish Medical records were 
admissible and acknowledging that the Referee and Industrial Commission appointed a 
Spanish Translator who was present at the hearing, namely a Mercedes Lupercio. 
(Hearing 4:6-13); January 10,2012 Hearing: "I will make note also that while we have the 
benefit of our interpreter present today, I might have the interpreter interpret for us those 
portions .... " (January 10, 2012 Hearing 24:4-6); However, Appellant's request for Mr. 
Lupercio to translate the remaining records was denied. 
The Equal Protection Clause proclaims that "No State shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Sec. 1. 
This rule of equal treatment does not depend on the existence of an underlying property 
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right. Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374, 1381 (lIth Cir.l994), cert. 
denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 729, 130 L.Ed.2d 633 (1995). 
When a classification involves a "suspect class" or a minority, then a strict scrutiny 
standard is used City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-42, 
(1985). The United States Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
recently upheld the above standards and clarified that an equal protection case can be held 
and deemed unconstitutional when there is an denial of equal treatment that results from 
the imposition of a barrier, but does not result in the ultimate inability to obtain benefits. 
It is by now well established that "all racial classifications reviewable under the 
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized." Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). This" 'standard of review ... is not dependent 
on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.' " Ibid. 
(quoting Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). Thus, "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any 
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification 
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial 
scrutiny." Adarand, 515 U.S., at 224. 
Id. (See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,908 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339, 343-344). The standards of equal protection analysis have been recognized in 
Idaho. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357 (1983). The United States Supreme Court in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) clarified that all government racial 
classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, that race based 
actions must be necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, that such actions 
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and violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to further that 
interest, and that context matters when reviewing such action. 
The requirement of the additional costs of non English speaking minorities also 
would have a disparate impact upon all minorities. The Supreme Court of the United 
States Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S. 
252 (1977) clarified that rule would be unconstitutional if it disproportionately impacted 
one race, if the background of the official action involved prior decisions about race, the 
sequence of events leading up to the decision and legislative history. 
Claimant and other similarly situated minority non-English speaking Claimants' 
rights are violated by the "new rule" in violation of both the state and federal constitutional 
rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection when they adopted 
the new policy of refusing to admit any medial records if it is in the language of the 
Claimant's Spanish language or was unable to afford the additional cost and burden to 
provide a certified translation of such. This is especially true in following the recent 
decision by the Industrial Commission in Serrano v. Four Season Framing; IC NO 2004-
507845 to disallow pennanent disability benefits for those who refuse to answer question 
regarding their immigration status. 
As previously cited, "The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is 
really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities." -Lord Acton (John E. E. 
Dalberg Acton) English historian, statesman (1834-1902). "Our courts are the great 
levelers." Roughly paraphrasedfrom the movie, "To Kill a Mockingbird" 
23 
X. THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY WITHDREW 
THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S COURT-APPOINTED TRANSLATOR 
AND REFUSED TO ALL THE COURT INTERPRETER TO ORALLY 
TRANSLATE EXHIBITS WRITTEN IN HIS NATIVE LANGUAGE IN 
VIOLATION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S STATE AND 
FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Respondents did not address the Industrial Commission's decision to temporarily 
withdraw the court appointed translator and not allow him to translate the records herein, 
therefore not additional arguments are cited here other than to incorporate the arguments 
made above. 
XI. THE REFEREE AND THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW OR ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY FAILED TO 
GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S 
FIRST AND SECOND VERIFIED MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS WHICH 
REQUESTED SANCTIONS OR AN ORDER TO COMPEL FILED ON OR 
ABOUT SEPTEMBER 1, 2011 AND THE ASSOCIATED ORDERS ON 
MOTION DATED NOVEMBER 4, 2011 AND FILED ON OR ABOUT 
NOVEMBER 23, 2011. 
Respondents allege that the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction over 
the Respondent and was therefore not subject to the Subpoena and or Notice of Deposition 
served upon his attorney of records as he was outside the State of Idaho. If this argument 
is the prevailing argument, then the Respondent's briefs and answer should be stricken as 
he is no longer subject to the jurisdiction. Respondent can not have his cake by not 
appearing and to eat it to have his attorney appear and argue his case. This especially 
unfair and unjust to the Appellant when the burden is on the Appellant to prove his case 
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and the information and testimony in the possession of the Respondent who refuses to 
appear telephonically or otherwise. The arguments of the Respondent that he is not 
subject to the jurisdiction supports Appellant's claim that default should be entered and 
Respondent's briefs be stricken. 
However, if this court believes that default should not be entered against the 
Respondent, the Respondent should not be able to avoid jurisdiction under grounds of 
public policy and established law. First, allowing a party from refusing to appear, testify, 
provide records or otherwise participate in the workers compensation because they have 
left the state of Idaho would be against public policy as it would lead to employers 
intentionally leaving the state to avoid claimants from obtaining records and testimony 
necessary for the claimant. 
Second, Idaho State 5-514 clarifies that Respondent employer voluntarily subjected 
himself to the jurisdiction to the state of Idaho by transacting business and ensuring the 
Appellant in the state ofIdaho. Idaho Statute 5-514 states as follows: 
§ 5-514. Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state. 
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts 
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or 
corporation, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of 
said acts: 
The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined 
as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or 
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business 
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association 
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or corporation; 
The commission of a tortious act within this state; 
The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this 
state; 
Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at 
the time of contracting; 
See also, Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., 657 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1983) 
Respondent Employer further subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court by 
appearing and defending the case through his attorney; had the court not obtained 
jurisdiction over the Respondent employer, the Industrial Commission's decision would be 
Void. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 5(b )(F) allows service upon a party by service upon 
the attorney of the party via fax. 
The most important key to a contested case is the testimony of disinterested 
witnesses to establish whether Appellant was injured on the job on the 10th of September 
2010 or not. Appellant sought in discovery and the Respondent Employer failed and 
refused to answer discovery and failed and refused to appear at his deposition wherein the 
hearing officer Ordered the Respondent Employer to provide the current address, i-9 and 
contact for the employees that were working with the Appellant the week of his injury. 
Defendants acknowledged in Defendants' Response to Claimant's Second Verified Motion 
for Sanction (Agency Record, 45) that "These responding defendants do acknowledge the 
fact that, to date, the list of employees working for the defendant employer during the time 
period of September 5-26, 2010 have not yet been provided." 
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Notwithstanding the assertions and productions by the Respondents in discovery by 
counsel, the record is replete from any assertions from the Respondent Employer at the 
hearing, through affidavit or otherwise that they provided the records requested in 
Discovery and Ordered. Further, the record clarifies that the Respondent Employer failed 
and refused to attempt to locate and or tender the current address, i-9 and employment 
records for the employees that were working the week of Appellant's accident. 
Respondent employer Roberto Corral, Sr. (President), Corral Agriculture, Inc 
(Records Custodian), Jorge Coronado (Supervisor) failed to timely answer discovery and 
failed and refused to appear at the time set for deposition set for the 1 st of September 2011 
and the Defendants Roberto Corral Sr (President) and Luisa Corral (Secretary) failed to 
appear at trial despite subpoenas being issued signed by the Industrial Commission on the 
23rd of January 2012. (Claimant's Exhibit 23-24, Hearing Transcript 355) (Agency 
Record, 8-18, 38-43). Roberto Corral, Jr. even admitted at the hearing that Roberto 
Corral, Sr. would have been one of the best employees to find out and provide evidence of 
which employees were actually there working with Appellant during the time of the 
accident. (Hearing Transcript 335:8-22) 
Roberto Corral, Jr. was the vice president of Corral Agriculture, Inc. (Hearing 
Transcript, 340:16-17) and Roberto Corral, Sr. was the president of Corral Agriculture, 
Inc. at the time of accident herein; Roberto Corral, Sr. was incarcerated and deported and 
Corral Agriculture, Inc. was administratively dissolved January 13, 2012 wherein Roberto 
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Corral, Jr. incorporated "Corral AG Labor, Inc" and at his deposition admitted that 
employees that were working with the Claimant in 2010 returned to work for Roberto 
Corral, Jr. at Corral AG Labor, Inc, the new business, and that he had not requested the 
payroll records from his agent "Ashmead and Associates in Nampa" to locate or obtain the 
updated current address or contact information of the employees. (Deposition of Roberto 
Corral Jr., 5:21 - 6:3) (Claimant's Exhibit 17) (See also Idaho Secretary of State, 
Business Entity) (Hearing Transcript offer of proof, 337:2 - 340:6) 
Roberto Corral, Jr. also admitted at the hearing that even as of the date of the 
hearing he had failed and refused to investigate his telephone records to determine 
communications with the Appellant after the accident to prove or disprove notice or 
whether the line was disconnected. (Hearing Transcript 327:12-25; 332: 19-25) 
Defendant's incomplete and untimely disclosure on the 15th of December 2011 
with outdated 1-9 addresses of the employees did not contain any current address in the 
possession of Defendant and the vice president of the company 
Due the inaction of the Respondent Employer and the decision of the hearing 
officer, Appellant was left at trial without the most important key to meet his burden, the 
current address of the half dozen workers that were present on the 10th of September 2010. 
Appellant was able to obtain letters from two workers, but the workers refused to provide 
Appellant their address to serve subpoenas. 
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Therefore, the Respondent should have either been sanctioned for not appearing 
and withholding testimony and records that Appellant needed, or default should have been 
entered as he was not subject to its jurisdiction. 
XII. THE COMMISSION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO DENY MR. FONSECA'S CLAIM 
BECAUSE IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO 
ENFORCE ITS ORDER TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND THE 
COMMISSION DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
The court in Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325 (2008) reversed the 
ruling and finding of the referee decision regarding credibility of the Claimant. Because 
the Court found that the Commission's findings on McAtee's substantive credibility were 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Court was not bound by those 
findings on appeal and may review the factual record in a light independent of those 
findings. McAtee clarified that an element to support of lack of credibility when the 
claimant's testimony contradicts with it self and improves or enhances over time 
substantially and will be upheld if the facts support such. 
While recognizing that the referee and the Industrial Commission regularly make 
determination of credibility when there is conflicting testimony from two witnesses; the 
Appellant provided testimony and evidence that was not conflicted or changed over time. 
Appellant consistently testified that he was working picking apples on a ladder at the 
orchard with half a dozen employees which was substantiated by the employment records 
and such testimony was supported by his medical provider to support his contention of the 
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accident, that he was injured when he fell from the ladder, and that he went horne early. 
(See citations above which are incorporated herein from Appellant's Final Reply Brief, pp 
8-12.) 
The Respondents allege that Appellant's substantive credibility is highly suspect 
due to "inaccuracies or conflicting facts" without providing any conflicting testimonies 
that are relevant or substantive to the case at hand. Further, the Respondents allege that 
Appellant must not be credible because his testimony differed from those of the 
Respondent and their contractor who had a relationship and bias in favor of the 
Respondent. 
The Respondent and the Industrial Commission discount the testimony of the 
Appellant because his testimony regarding facts that occurred after the accident differs 
from the memory of the Respondent employer. However, the record is vacant of any 
contradictory testimony of Appellant regarding being injured and when being injured. 
Respondent allege that Appellant was untruthful when his testimony differed from Jorge 
Coronado without accounting for the fact that Jorge Corondao finally admitted, contrary to 
his previous testimony under oath, that Mr. Coronado did not start working at the 
Williamson Orchard until the September 17 or 18, 2010, one week after the accident. 
(T.H. 291:1 -13)(C15;5:10 - 18) 
The referee and Industrial Commission failed to address the fact that Roberto 
Corral Jr. was the vice president of the company over finances when Roberto Corral Sr. 
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lost his legal permanent residence and was deported due to a felony conviction after tax 
problems (TH 335:23 - 336:1; 339:8 - 340:6); and that the referee disallowed any further 
testimony regarding such despite allowing testimony regarding criminal history of the 
Appellant to be admitted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Fonseca respectfully requests that this Court either 
reverse the order of the Commission, or remand his case to the Commission with 
instructions to reopen his case to consider evidence consistent with Appellant's herein. 
Appellant further request costs and fees for the Appeal Reply Brief herein as previously 
requested and under IRCP S4(e)(1) and Idaho Code 12-12l. 
DATED this Snd day of August. 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of August 2013 I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE CLAIMANT/APPELLANT to the following via 
hand delivery and facsimile: 
David J. Lee 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
1215 W State Street 
Boise, ID 83720 
Fax No.: 208-332-2225 
By: 
---Y~~~~~--
Rich 
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